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I.  Introduction 
 
China is undertaking a set of simultaneous, though gradual, domestic financial 
and capital account liberalization. At the same time, its financial sector is also 
experiencing increased foreign competition as the country has already started to allow 
considerable foreign participation in its domestic financial sector. 2007 will be a 
watershed year as China will have to fully implement its WTO commitments on 
financial services trade liberalization. 
 
While foreign banks in emerging markets promote efficiency through enhanced 
competition and transfer of skills (Claessens, et al … 2001, Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS), 2004), they also pose challenges to policy makers in areas 
of managing liberalization pace, upgrading  supervision skills, and conducting 
monetary policy. Empirical findings suggest that with more countries embarking 
upon financial liberalization, the risk of financial crises has also increased. It was 
observed that since the 1980s, over two-thirds of IMF member countries have 
experienced significant problems in the banking sector (Lindgren, et. al…1996).  
Studies on the relationship between financial liberalization and banking crisis also 
indicate that financial liberalization raises the probability of a banking crisis 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998).  Moreover, in emerging market economies, a 
banking crisis is usually associated with a balance of payment crisis when the 
country’s capital account is open (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000).  
 
Because financial services trade liberalization often involves capital flows, 
foreign participation will certainly complicate the ongoing process of domestic 
financial and capital account liberalization in emerging market economies. It is 
hypothesized that foreign bank participation would accelerate both domestic financial 
and capital account liberalization and in particular, it would make a host country’s 
capital control regime progressively more ineffective, thus leading to de facto capital 
account liberalization. Without necessary modifications regarding their exchange rate 
regimes and the ways they conduct monetary policies, emerging market economies 
may experience inherent policy inconsistencies that could eventually lead to capital 
account crises. 
 
This paper intends to examine these issues raised above in two segments: First, it 
examines the impact of foreign bank presence on China’s rapidly evolving domestic 
and external financial liberalization. Using China as a case study, the paper intends to 
shed light on whether foreign participation helps accelerate China’s domestic 
financial and capital account liberalization. The paper then examines the impact of 
the WTO financial services trade liberalization commitments and especially the 
banking sector commitments on bank loans to developing economies. Specifically, 
the empirical study of this section hopes to shed light on whether financial services 
trade liberalization helps promote bank loans to developing economies.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides an updated review on the 
General Agreement of Trade in Services with a focus on the financial services.   3
Section III examines whether foreign bank presence in China helps accelerate 
domestic financial and capital account liberalization. Section IV presents some 
empirical findings on whether the financial services trade liberalization commitments 
promote bank loans to emerging market economies. Section V discusses implications 
for policy. 
 
II.  Financial Services Trade Liberalization under the GATS 
 
II. 1: GATS Rules: An updated review  
 
Financial services trade liberalization negotiations (FSTLN), under the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), aims at reducing or even totally removing 
all trade barriers in financial services sector by allowing foreign financial firms in 
insurance, banking, securities industry and other related financial services sectors to 
enter a host country and enjoy national treatment. The GATS, launched in the 
Uruguay Round in 1986, was not able to reach any agreement until April 1994, 
several months after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993 (Kono, 
et al …, 1997). Negotiations on financial services agreements were also extended far 
beyond the Uruguay Round and finally reached agreement in 1997. In the current and 
new Doha round of WTO negotiations, financial services and other services will be a 
“built-in” agenda, thus having the benefit of renewed emphasis (Key, 2003). 
  
 FSTLN specifies general commitments, specific exemptions, and modes of 
supply of services. These commitments governing modes of financial services 
supplied and they can differ from country to country and can be phased in over time 
depending on the initial agreements. However, the general commitments of GATS 
also apply to FSTLN have the following features (Kono, et al …, 1997): 
1 
 
•  Most favored nation (MFN): All liberalization measures must be extended 
to all WTO members equally. 
•  Market access and national treatment: WTO member countries can not 
discriminate between domestic and foreign firms, except when explicitly 
indicated at the time of joining the GATS. 
•  Transparency: Local regulations should be published and made accessible 
to all. 
•  Progressive liberalization: Member states agree to increase the number of 
liberalized sectors and to eliminate exceptions within sectors by 
committing to future negotiating rounds. 
•  Dispute settlement mechanism: All commitments are legally binding. 
Harmed states can initiate an arbitration procedure. If found harmed, the 
country can impose sanctions against the violating country.  
                                                 
1 If international contestability of markets is based on three pillars: 1) National treatment and market 
access; 2) Domestic structural reform, and 3) Freedom of capital flows, the current FSTL under the GATS 
only deals with the first issue, national treatment and market access. The second issue will be a central 
topic of the Doha round. The third issue is a concern of the IMF and not a trade liberalization issue (Key 
2003).     4
 
However, FSTLN also has some important exemptions:  
 
•  Exemption for government services: Activities of the central banks or 
other government authorities carrying out monetary and exchange rate 
policies are excluded from GATS. 
•  Prudential carve-out: It is exempted from GATS and is designed to ensure 
that host country governments can protect their domestic financial system 
and participants of the financial system through the application of the host 
country prudential standards. These prudential measures in principle do 
not have to comply with the national treatment, market access 
commitments and its most favored nation responsibility (Key, 2003). 
However, the prudential carve-out is not meant to be an overriding 
exception to a member’s obligations, as prudential measures should not be 
used to avoid a member’s obligation or commitments. 
•  Some non-prudential related government regulations (for example, 
practices related to industrial policy to provide credit to certain industries) 
are also exempted from the commitments of the GATS unless such 
policies violate the general commitments as specified above (Kono, et al 
…, 1997).  
 
Similar to other types of services, FSTLN also covers four modes of supply: 
cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and movements of 
natural persons. 
 
•  Mode 1 or cross-border supply: If a consumer in country A and a supplier 
in country B, the service crosses the border to meet the need of the 
consumer in Country A (e.g., A Japanese bank in Tokyo lends to a 
Chinese firm in Shanghai). Depending on the nature of transactions, this 
mode of supply in financial services will often involve not only financial 
services but also capital flows (Table 1). 
•  Mode 2 or consumption abroad: It refers to a scenario that a consumer in 
Country A will have to travel to Country B where the service supplier is 
located in order to conduct a transaction (e.g., A Japanese company opens 
a bank account with a bank in China (a Japanese, other foreign, or even a 
domestic Chinese bank) for transactions occurring in China).  
•  Mode 3 or commercial presence: It refers to a service in country A 
provided by a supplier in country B took place at a permanent place of 
business located in country A (e.g., A Japanese bank lends firms in China   
through its branch in China) (Table 2). 
•  Mode 4 or movement of natural persons: It refers to a service in country A 
is provided by country B with personnel imported from country B (e.g., A 
branch of a Japanese bank draws its management from its headquarters in 
Tokyo).  
 
   5
As discussed above, measures undertaken for prudential purposes are exempted 
from the basic rules. Because there is no necessity test of validity, such “carve-outs” 
could be potentially used as restrictions or barriers for foreign entry. In addition, only 
a sovereign, not a private bank, can bring complains to the WTO dispute panel (Key, 
2003).  
 
Although financial services often involve capital flows, the FSTLN under GATS 
does not have any authority to override the measures of capital controls in a host 
economy. Under capital controls, a cross-border financial service trade may occur but 
not necessarily the capital flows associated with the service. This is because FSTLN 
under GATS has to be consistent with the current account transactions of the IMF 
Articles of Agreement. It does not, however, cover capital account transactions. In 
principle, countries that have signed on the GATS in financial services can continue 
to engage their capital control measures and practices.  
 
Table 3 uses the banking business as an example to highlight the areas in which 
foreign bank entry not only brings financial services trade but also cross-border 
capital flows. Out of 17 categories of banking business in Mode 1, only three types of 
banking business can take place without involving capital flows (financial leasing, 
provision of financial information, and financial advisory). Only in Mode 3 
(Commercial Presence), most financial services trade can occur so long as foreign 
capitals are not involved. 
 
Despite these perceived limitations, FSTLN under GATS is an important step 
forward in liberalizing the financial service trade worldwide as it provides national 
treatment to foreign financial firms, promotes transparency of financial regulations, 
and promises further liberalization in financial services. Similar to foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing sectors, the impact of foreign participation in a host 
country may be much larger than one can contemplate based only on the existing 
WTO rules and regulations.  
 
       
III.  China’s WTO Financial Services Commitments and their Implications  
 
China signed the GATS upon its WTO accession at the end of 2001. Although 
there is a phasing-out period of five years with respect to business scope (local 
currency vs. foreign exchange banking business), customers (resident vs. nonresident, 
consumer vs. firms), and geographic location (Appendix I), its overall commitment is 
relatively liberal compared with countries in East Asia and most of the developing 
economies (Figure 1). Even before its WTO commitments, foreign banks have 
already been allowed to operate in certain geographic areas with progressively 
liberalized scope of banking businesses (Table 4). However, the opening was 
relatively modest because such liberalizations were only unilateral and based on the 
country’s own economic needs, which may be quite different from the multilateral 
and rule-based financial services trade liberalization under the GATS that are 
anticipated, transparent, and extended to all members of the WTO.    6
III.1: Foreign Bank Presence in China 
 
  Size, entry form and location: By all measures, foreign banks at present have a 
relatively small presence in China. Their total asset size is only 1.4 percent of the 
national banking asset (Table 5)
2 and their primary form of entry is through branches 
(Table 6). There are 162 foreign bank branches by the end of June 2004, whereas 
there are only 14 foreign subsidiaries. In terms of asset size, subsidiary is only 6 
percent of the total foreign assets in China (Table 7). With respect to geographic 
locations, foreign banks are predominantly located in two coast cities: Shanghai and 
Shenzhen (Figure 2).  
 
Motivation of Entry and Customers: The motivation for foreign banks to enter the 
Chinese market is no different from the experiences of other countries: Foreign banks 
follow their customers’ FDI activities (Nigh, Cho, and Krishman, 1986).
3 Figure 3 
shows that foreign banks’ assets by country or region in China correspond closely to 
their respective country’s or region’s FDI presence in China. The correlation 
coefficient is quite high at 0.8. As foreign banks follow their firms, it is not surprising 
that they have mainly lent to their manufacturing FDI firms (Table 8).  
 
Funding sources: Over 60 percent of foreign bank loans are made in US dollars 
(Table 8). The RMB loans, supported by the increase RMB deposits, have grown 
rapidly in recent years. Despite such growth, foreign banks’ RMB loans are mainly 
hampered by the restriction that they are only allowed to do RMB business in some 
restricted geographic areas with foreign affiliated firms and only recently with 
Chinese firms.
4 In the past, foreign banks mainly depended on the inter-bank market 
for their RMB loans. But once the restrictions on doing RMB businesses with firms 
are removed, their RMB loans have been largely supported by their RMB deposits 
from firms. Foreign banks are less and less dependent on the inter-bank market for 
RMB loans (Figure 4). 
 
Other than the inter-bank market, loans of foreign banks not covered by deposits 
will have to be supported by borrowings either from their headquarters. Owing to 
limited deposit base and the restrictions to borrow from the inter-bank market prior to 
1998, foreign bank loans until 2000 relied almost entirely on funds from their head 
offices. Indeed, once they are able to access the inter-bank markets in China, funds 
borrowed from headquarters until June 2003 merely meet the needs of loans. It also 
appears that net borrowing from head offices follows rather closely with the 
expectations of the RMB exchange rate. Because of the expectation of a RMB 
depreciation during the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, the net borrowing of foreign 
                                                 
2 This should be interpreted in relative terms as Chinese banks have increased their lending rapidly in 
recent years in an attempt to reduce the non-performing loan ratio in spite of foreign banks’ increased 
presence in China.  
3 However, a recent paper by Seth et al. (1998) showed that these patterns are not necessarily valid for 
Japanese and European banks in the US market.  
4 Foreign banks are allowed to engage in the RMB business with both foreign entities and Chinese firms in 
18 cities. There are still restrictions for them to deal with Chinese deposits. However, such restrictions will 
be removed by the end of 2006.    7
banks from their head offices declined rapidly from over $22 billion in 1997 to 
merely $6 billion in 2002. However, since the end of 2002 the borrowing from 
headquarters has increased considerably, exceeding the need of loans extended, 
largely reflecting the reverse of the expectation on RMB’s valuation. Direct 
borrowing from head offices is one of the most important channels that foreign banks 
can affect China’s cross-border capital flows.
5 
 
III. 2: Impact of Foreign Bank Presence on China’s Domestic Financial 
Liberalization 
 
  Despite their relative small size, the impact of foreign banks has already been felt 
in terms of helping accelerate domestic financial liberalization and reform. Domestic 
financial liberalization includes a) interest rate liberalization through elimination of 
interest rate and price controls; b) removal of entry barriers through admission of new 
entrants both domestic and foreign based on transparent regulatory requirements; c) 
removal of barriers on the scopes of financial business; d) reduction of sector barriers 
to allow financial industry to compete each other’s traditional scope of business; and  
e) less state involvement through privatization of state-owned financial intermediaries 
and reduction of direct lending (Capiro, Honohan, and Stiglitz, 2001). 
 
  1) The impact of foreign banks on China’s interest rate liberalization: China’s 
interest rate liberalization essentially follows a standard textbook sequencing 
approach: Short-term rates are liberalized before long-term rates, lending rates before 
the borrowing rates, and lending and deposit rates of foreign currency before that of 
domestic currency. At this moment, inter-bank rates and government bond rates are 
fully determined by markets (Figure 5). On January 1 2004, bank lending rates were 
allowed to fluctuate between 10 percent below and 170 percent above the base one-
year lending rate set by the Central Bank. After October 29
th 2004, the limit on the 
upper bound of lending rate has been abolished. Although deposit rates are not yet 
fully liberalized, the deposit rates of large deposits can be negotiated between 
depositors and banks. The rationale of such a sequencing strategy appears to aim at 
protecting the franchise value of banks so as to avoid excessive competition for 
deposits among banks.  
 
  Foreign banks, because of their small RMB deposit base, have always been active 
participants
6 of the inter-bank markets since 1998 and their participation has acted to 
help unify the national inter-bank market by breaking barriers of regional 
segmentation. One concrete case was in the early days of foreign entry in the inter-
bank RMB market. Shanghai and Shenzhen are two major inter-bank market centers. 
To prevent excessive competition for businesses of foreign banks, the Bankers 
Association in Shenzhen reached an agreement that the RMB loan rates to foreign 
                                                 
5 Realizing this tendency, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued a new regulation in 
June 2004 by restricting total amount of foreign banks’ short-term borrowing to a quota that is no more 
than 5 times of operating capital of a foreign bank branch or subsidiary.  
6 Foreign banks’ net borrowing from the inter-bank market is about 8.2 percent of the inter-bank trading 
volume at the end of June 2004.   8
banks should not be below 20 percent of the average standard lending rate. However, 
the Shanghai inter-bank market center did not have such an anti-competition practice. 
Indeed, available data indicate that the inter-bank rates in Shanghai could go down as 
much as 36 percent in 2001 (Huang 2004). As a result, foreign banks did most of the 
borrowing in the Shanghai market. Fearing of losing market shares to Shanghai, the 
Shenzhen Bankers’ Association eventually revoked the practice in 2002.  
 
  2) Fee-Based Business: After China’s accession to the WTO by the end of 2001, 
foreign banks operating in China could immediately conduct foreign exchange 
business with Chinese depositors. Although foreign banks provide better services, 
customers would have to pay for such services, which were not entirely expected by 
Chinese customers. For example, Citibank in 2002 charged depositors $6 or 50 RMB 
monthly if the monthly average deposit of a customer is less than $5000 dollars. 
Other foreign banks such as HSBC and Bank of East Asia also had charges on 
deposits but of various forms. Domestic banks followed the examples of foreign 
banks quickly and started charging fees on foreign currency deposits. They then 
started to charge fees on ATM transactions across banking groups. With respect to the 
RMB business, domestic banks also innovated by providing differentiated services 
offered to their large depositors.  
 
Fee-based business, a vague area in China’s commercial bank regulation, caused 
many legal disputes between consumers and the banking sector. The regulatory 
authority then had to revise regulations on this issue by issuing a new rule to clarify 
the scope of the fee-based businesses that commercial banks are able to conduct. It 
finally recognized the principle that fee-based business is legal with only limited 
exceptions. Commercial banks are granted the right to charge fees on their 
intermediation businesses. Certain prices of the fee-based businesses are regulated by 
the government, but the majority of them are determined by the market. Because of 
strong opposition from the consumer groups, a compromised solution was reached on 
the RMB deposits. Fees charged on foreign currency deposits remain. However, 
banks are not allowed to charge fees on the RMB deposits.  
 
  3) Impact on the scope of banking business: One important feature of China’s 
financial service trade liberalization agreement is that criteria for authorization to 
operate in China’s financial sector are based on prudential means alone and are not 
based on economic needs test or quantitative limits on licenses.
7 As a result, 
corresponding changes in regulation after the accession must be made. From 2002-
2003, the bank supervisory authority has removed 26 bank businesses from the list 
that requires approval. Certain banking businesses once granted, the headquarters of a 
bank can decide whether its bank branch can conduct such business, without further 
approval from the regulatory authority. For those new categories of banking 
businesses that require approval from the regulatory authority, once an application is 
filed, a decision should be made within 10 business days. Indeed, the WTO accession 
                                                 
7 See report of the Working Party on the accession of China, WTO October 2001. 
   9
has sped up the converging process of the Chinese regulatory practices to the 
international standard. Transparency and efficiency have been improving.   
 
  4) Impact on financial regulation: The case of the financial holding company: 
China’s Commercial Bank Laws, modified in 2003, stipulates that commercial banks 
operating in China are prohibited from engaging in trust and securities business, 
investing in real restate business not for self use, and investing non-bank financial 
institutions and enterprises only with limited exceptions.
8  Indeed, the Bank of China 
Group is one of such exceptions. It controls 3 commercial banks, 3 investment banks, 
1 mutual fund, and 2 insurance companies. However, large foreign banks operating in 
China are generally within a financial holding group and they are perceived to have 
unfair advantage over the Chinese banks.
9 As a result, a new law on financial holding 
group is under discussion. In addition, because of foreign entry and the presence of its 
own financial holding groups, China has put great emphasis on cross-agency 
coordination and information sharing in its amended Central Bank and Commercial 
Bank Law. The newly established financial stability bureau is supposed to be in 
charge of such coordination. 
 
  5) Impact on new entry into the financial sector and privatization of state owned 
commercial banks: Since 1996, the regulatory authority has authorized 112 city 
commercial banks and 4 rural commercial banks to be formed. Many of them were 
merged from city and rural cooperatives. If China can offer national treatment to 
foreign banks under its WTO obligations, how it should treat the entry of newly 
formed and privately-owned banks has raised strong interests in recent years. The 
banking regulatory commission, in stead of issuing more new banking licenses to 
allow domestic entry, has taken an approach to encouraging private investors to be 
equity shareholders of existing banks. Even if a privately-owned Chinese bank 
applies for a banking license, the applicant will be required to have a foreign investor 
as a strategic partner. Based on the experiences of and lessons learned from emerging 
market and transition economies, private banks mushroomed after financial 
liberalization have failed in great numbers and eventually the tax payers would have 
to shoulder the losses. Therefore, the domestic entry should be treated with great care. 
In this sense, the current regulation is prudent. However, because of the lack of 
transparency on financial conditions of city commercial and state owned banks, 
private investors have been quite hesitant in becoming shareholders. They fear that 
their investments are going to be used to fill the holes of NPLs but at the same time, 
they can not participate effectively in the decision making process because the state 
remains as the majority shareholder. Indeed, the privatization process of the big four 
state-owned commercial banks faces similar dilemma if the state is unwilling to yield 
its majority control on these banks.  
   
III.3: Capital Controls and Prudential Regulations on Foreign Entry 
                                                 
8 Article 35, section 2 of the Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2003. 
9 For example, foreign holding financial companies are viewed as “supermarket”, whereas Chinese 
commercial banks are viewed as “specialty” shops that lack economies of scale to compete with foreign 
entities (Huang, 2004).   10
 
  Although China’s financial services trade liberalization is more liberal compared 
with countries in East Asia as presented in Figure 5, many capital account related 
financial services trade transactions would be limited because of its existing capital 
controls. Table 9 reviews China’s capital controls related to commercial credits. 
Indeed, the existing capital control regime has made the direct cross-border 
commercial bank credit flows mostly limited. Consequently, most banking business 
related to Mode I, cross-border supply, will be restricted. However, Mode III, or 
commercial presence will be largely allowed (Table 3).  
 
As mentioned above, whether a foreign bank can enter the Chinese market is 
mainly determined by prudential considerations. As a part of its prudential measures, 
only large and reputable foreign banks are allowed to enter the market. For example, 
in order to set up a branch in China, a foreign bank must have a total asset of at least 
$20 billion at the end of the year prior to filing an application. However, for a foreign 
bank that wishes to set up a joint venture with a Chinese bank, the required amount of 
bank assets is only half of that of an independent branch.  
 
The operating capital requirement also varies with the range of business a foreign 
bank wishes to provide in China. For example, if a foreign bank branch is interested 
in providing a full range of banking businesses for all types of customers, the branch 
capital requirement is US $500 million. In addition, the branch capital will be divided 
into domestic currency and foreign currency with at least $300 million in RMB and 
the rest in US dollar.  
 
If a bank that wishes to set up a subsidiary, it must have an operating capital of at 
least US$1 billion, of which $600 million should be in RMB and the rest in US dollar. 
The same requirement applies to forming a joint venture bank. In addition, the branch 
capital of a foreign subsidiary or a joint venture should not be less than US$300 
million, of which $200 million should be in RMB.  
 
Finally, if a foreign subsidiary or a joint-venture subsidiary wishes to expand its 
branch network, it should have been operating in China for at least 3 years and should 
be profitable for at least 2 years. In addition, when setting up a branch, 100 million 
RMB is required as operating capital for the branch. In addition, its total sub-branch 
capital should not exceed 60 percent of the registered capital. The branch rule implies 
that for a foreign subsidiary with a registered capital of US$1 billion, the maximum 
branches it is able to establish is about 6.           
 
III.4: Impact of Foreign Bank Presence on China’s Cross-Border Capital Flows: 
 
By a conventional measure, China has already become a highly opened economy 
with its total trade close to 60 percent of GDP. Capital flows from the lead and lag of 
its trade alone are estimated at $170 billion (Ma and McCauley, 2004). As foreign 
banks have already been able to deal with joint-venture, foreign-funded, and Chinese 
firms, they play an active role in intermediating China’s capital flows. Table 10   11
shows that foreign-funded firms and foreign banks borrowed over $58.5 billion in 
2003, or 20 percent of total Chinese external debt in that year.  
 
 Foreign banks, once in China, certainly have opened more channels for cross-
border capital flows, thus making China’s capital controls more porous. Indeed, 
foreign banks may have played an active role in intermediating short-term bank loans 
to China.  
 
Interest rates on foreign exchange loans and large deposit in China after 
liberalization in 2000 are usually set by LIBOR or HIBOR plus 100 to 200 basis 
points. Since the fourth quarter of 2000, the 3-month LIBOR rate has fallen rapidly, 
largely reflecting the Fed’s aggressive monetary ease. On the other hand, China’s 
short-term lending rate for RMB loans less than 6 months has been hovering slightly 
above 5 percent, thus providing arbitrage opportunities for foreign banks. They can 
borrow from the London market at rate of less than 2 percent and then lend to foreign 
funded or joint venture firms in China or even to Chinese firms after 2002 at LIBOR 
plus 1 to 2 percent, netting a profit of at least 1 to 2 percent of the lending. Such loans 
are also welcomed by the firms because they can quickly exchange dollar loans to 
RMB and save at least one to two percent interest rate charges if they borrow in RMB. 
Indeed, this could be the reasons why China’s short term loans have gone up rapidly 
from around US $20 billion at the end of 1999 to US $38 billion in 2004 (Figure 6), 
thus prompting the SAFE to issue a regulation on June 21 2004 to intervene by 
setting a limit of short-term external debt of both foreign and domestic banks to no 
more than 5 times of their operation capital. Given the size of operating capital of 
foreign banks was 5.2 billion by the end of 2004, the maximum short-term debt 
outstanding per annum by the regulation is about $26 billion.  
 
 Another channel of moving capital in and out of the country is through borrowing 
from and lending to foreign branches’ head offices. Indeed, as Figure 4 already 
indicates, foreign banks’ net borrowing from their head offices is driven mainly by 
two factors: One is the amount of local currency they can amass in the local market to 
support their local currency lending activities. If foreign banks have access to the 
RMB, they will have less incentive to borrow from their head offices, thus less capital 
inflows and less exposure to external debt. This indeed argues for foreign banks to be 
given the access to local currency for purposes of their domestic lending needs. In 
addition, it is also easy for regulatory agency to monitor the funding motives of 
foreign banks and their transactions with head offices. The other factor is related to 
the exchange rate risk. Figure 4 clearly shows when the RMB is facing appreciation 
pressures, it creates incentives for foreign bank branches to borrow from their head 
offices and lend to their clients in China, whereas there is a depreciation pressure, 
they will borrow less from their head offices.  
 
The advantage that foreign banks have to arbitrage between domestic and external 
market and their privileges to borrow directly from their head offices will surely 
make China’s capital controls more porous and the existing control regime less 
effective. Indeed, the foreign bank presence in China at this moment is still relative   12
small. Should foreign bank operating capital double or even triple, say to $10 or 15 
billion, the maximum short-term foreign exchange debt outstanding per annum under 
the current regulation will be about US$50 or $75 billion. As capital flows have 
become large enough, onshore and offshore interest rate differential will essentially 
disappear, making capital control ineffective. In addition, financial derivatives, often 
making term structures of capital flows fungible, will pose even greater challenges for 
the authorities to monitor short-term capital flows (Garber, 2001).  
  
 
IV.  Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on Bank Loans to 
Emerging Market Economies: Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Arguments for foreign bank entry into domestic banking market are mainly based 
on increased funding sources, improved quality of financial services (Levine, 1997, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min, 1999), bank efficiency spillovers (Claussens, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 1998), and greater stability of credit in time of 
financial stress (Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney, 2001).  
 
The presence of foreign banks also helps improve host country’s financial market 
infrastructure by encouraging entry of a range of supporting industries such as credit 
rating agencies, accounting and auditing firms, and legal service (Glaessner and Oks, 
1994).  
 
However, arguments against foreign bank participation are mainly based on fears 
that 1) domestic financial industry is a strategic industry that is best controlled by 
domestic interests; 2) foreign entry increases competition and foreign banks “cherry-
pick” customers and markets; and 3) foreign banks are likely to facilitate capital 
flights when capital account is open. Indeed, on the competition ground, empirical 
evidence does indicate that an increase of foreign bank shares leads to a lower 
profitability of domestic banks.
10  
 
The effect of financial services trade liberalization on financial development and 
stability is a new and evolving issue. Using data from 27 emerging market economies, 
Kono and Schuknecht (2000) find that financial services trade liberalization reduces 
distortion and volatility of capital flows to developing countries, thus promoting 
financial sector stability. Similar findings were obtained by Kireyev (2002). However, 
Valckx (2002) finds that financial trade services liberalization is weakly linked to 
financial instability. In addition, more liberal commitments on commercial presence 
have systematically increased the likelihood of banking crises, most likely reflecting 
the short-run negative effect of increased foreign competition on host country’s 
financial services market. Bias toward cross-border supply of financial services, on 
the other hand, has increased the probability of a currency crisis because of increased 
volatile capital flows. The findings of these existing studies appear to provide 
contrasting empirical results: On the one hand, financial services trade liberalization 
promotes financial stability; on the other hand, they could lead to financial fragility. 
                                                 
10 Classens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998) and CGFS (2004).   13
 
However, the existing foreign bank literature has not paid much attention on the 
aspect of international bank loans to developing economies under the GATS. This 
section looks at the issue by applying a gravity model
11 to see whether financial 
services trade liberalization encourages bank loans to developing economies after 
adjusting for factors such as macroeconomic conditions, economic linkages, 
institutional quality, and traditional gravity variables that measure market size (GDP 
size), economic development (per capita GDP) and information asymmetry (distance 
between a lending and a borrowing country). 
 
The gravity model approach can be justified on several grounds. First, the well-
documented fact that countries of large economic size tend to trade more with each 
other indicates that economic size is an important determinant of trade credits and 
finance through international banks. Second, higher per capita income is closely 
associated with deeper financial markets, leading to greater international bank loans. 
Third, information asymmetry may become greater with a longer geographical 
distance between a lender and a borrower country, thereby raising monitoring costs 
and exerting a negative influence over cross-border bank loans. In addition, to the 
extent that the lender country has closer economic, political, and historical ties with a 
borrower country, international bank loans to the latter tend to be higher. These 
linkages in this context act as factors that reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry and therefore facilitate cross-border banking transactions. Finally, certain 
macroeconomic, institutional, and history of default variables of the borrower country 
can also help explain why some countries attract more bank loans than others.  After 
adjusting for these factors, we will then be able to estimate the impact of two specific 
issues of our interests. 
 
•  Whether emerging market economies that have signed upon financial services 
trade liberalization under the GATS attract more bank loans from developed 
economies than those that have not. 
•  For the emerging market economies that have already made liberalization 
commitments, whether the level of liberalization commitment helps attract more 
bank loans from developed economies. 
 
The paper also takes into account recent theoretical advances that recognize the 
importance of the country fixed effect, or the so called “multilateral resistance factor”, 
in empirical applications of the gravity model (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 
Rose, 2003, Subramanian and Wei, 2003). The estimating regression equation can 
then be specified as follows: 
                                                 
11 The theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model and its applications were reviewed by Frankel (1997). 
See Frankel (1997) for an application of the gravity model approach to explain the factors affecting the 
formation of trade blocs, Kawai and Urata (1998) on the relationship between trade and FDI using Japanese 
data at the industry level, Portes and Rey (1999) on the determinants of equity flows, Rose and Spiegel 
(2002) on the effect of a default on sovereign lending on bilateral trade, and Kawai and Liu (2004) on the 
determinants of bank loans to developing economies.  
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Here BLij indicates bank loans from developed country i to less developed  
country j. Vector Zijt represents key gravity variables such as economic size, per 
capita income, an indicator of economic development, and distance between a 
lender country i and borrower country j, which could also be interpreted as a proxy 
of information asymmetry. Vector Mj represents country fixed effect of loan 
recipient economies. Vector Xij represents variables related to bilateral country 
linkages, such as bilateral trade, official development assistance (ODA) and other 
economic linkage variables such as trade arrangements, geography, colonial ties, 
and common language. Vector Yj represents variables for a borrower country j 
related to its country risk such as macroeconomic volatility variables, institution 
characteristics such as whether a country has any explicit form of deposit insurance 
and whether the country has a higher level of domestic financial liberalization or 
capital account opening and other relevant factors. Vector Zj represents variables 
such as whether a loan recipient economy has signed upon the financial services 
trade liberalization and in addition, the intensity of the liberalization commitment.  
 
 The indexes of financial services trade liberalization are calculated and updated 
using the combined metrics of Mattoo (2000) and Valckx (2002). Detailed 
specifications are presented in Appendix II. The indexes are updated to 2003 as 
more countries have become members of the WTO and have signed the GATS. All 
gravity variables and some variables in Xij, Yi and Zj are also in logs, except for 
dummy variables. A detailed description of the data source is presented in 
Appendix III. 
 
Table 11 presents the empirical results of the gravity model regressions for both 
panel and five-year average cross-section specifications. For the panel regression, 
fixed-effect regression techniques are used because the recent theoretical advance 
that emphasizes the importance of multilateral resistance effect when applying the 
gravity model empirically. We use two indexes of FSTLN commitment: One is an 
index that includes all financial sectors (insurance, banking, securities, and other 
securities), WTO score total. The other is an index that measures the banking sector 
commitment only, WTO score banking.  
 
Gravity Variables: Equations 1 to 4 present panel regression results after 
adjusting for both time and country fixed effect. Indeed, gravity model variables 
explain the model well. The log GDP variables of lending and borrowing countries, 
a measure of country or market size, are statistically significant and have the right 
sign, indicating the larger the lending country, the more loans it provides; whereas 
the smaller the borrowing country, the relatively more loans it tends to receive at 
margin. Borrower countries of higher economic development as indicated by the 
per capita income do not necessarily receive more loans from lender countries 
although lender countries of higher economic development do provide more loans.   15
The distance between a lender and a borrower, an indicator of information 
asymmetry, is negatively and statistically significant, thus confirming that the 
farther away between a lender and a borrower, the less information tends to flow 
between them and therefore less bank loans.  
 
Economic Linkages: In general, the more trade between a borrowing and a 
lending country, the more bank loans will go from a lending country to a borrowing 
country, thus demonstrating that bilateral trade flows play a significant role in 
facilitating bank loans to developing economies. This also confirms empirical 
observations that trade financing and trade credit facilitate international trade. 
Official development assistance (ODA) plays a positive role in facilitating 
commercial bank loans to developing economies. Similarly, other economic 
linkage variables such as whether a lending and a borrowing country share a 
common border, a common language, or whether the borrowing country is a former 
colony of the lending country all help facilitate bank lending to developing 
economies.  
 
Country Risk Indicators: The model also attempts to capture the effect of how 
country risks measured by the exchange rate and GDP volatility, fiscal sector 
sustainability, and short-term debt as a share of foreign exchange reserves affect 
bank loans from a lender to a borrower country. However, these measures do not 
appear to be statistically significant.
12  
 
Institutional Quality and History of Default: Similarly, variables that attempt to 
measure institutional support or guarantee of the borrowing country’s banking 
system such as whether the country has an explicit deposit insurance system, 
financial sector quality and development, quality of rule of law as measured by the 
corruption index, and history of default measured by the IMF loan dummy variable 
all do not appear to be relevant here. Interestingly, whether a country has a high or 
a low degree of capital control simply does not matter, which appears to imply that 
capital control is not an important factor in affecting commercial loans to 
developing economies. 
 
Indexes of financial services trade liberalization commitment: Essentially, the 
paper is interested in determining whether a country signing upon the financial 
services trade liberalization commitment under the GATS helps it attract more 
international commercial bank loans. Indeed, the regression result shows that in 
general it is not helpful. This is true for both the overall financial services trade 
liberalization index in general and the banking sector liberalization index in 
particular. To some extent, such a result is not surprising. Our indexes do show that 
the financial services trade liberalization commitments do not necessarily correlate 
with the per capita income variable. Some small, low-income transition and African 
economies tend to have very liberal commitments. However, they do not 
necessarily receive international bank loans after adjusting for economic size, 
                                                 
12 When the country risk measure is replaced with a synthetic country risk rating variable such as the S&P 
sovereign ratings, similar result is obtained.     16
market potential and economic development. But this does not mean that it should 
be the case for all developing economies. When the developing country group is 
split into sub-regions such as Latin America, ASEAN countries plus Korea, China, 
and offshore financial centers, the result is indeed quite different. Making more 
liberal commitments helps promote more loans to China and offshore financial 
sector, although it has little effect on the Latin American countries as a whole and 
the group of ASEAN countries plus Korea.
13 
 
Results from the 5-year average regression: Similar results are found for the five-
year average cross-country regression. The difference is that most of the country 
risk indicators, institutional quality measures, and history of default measures have 
the right sign and some of these explanatory variables are also statistically 
significant. The other major difference is that regional effect of the financial 
services trade liberalization commitment indexes such as Latin America and 
ASEAN plus Korea have turned quite significant. On the other hand, the China 
effect measured by the overall financial services liberalization index is no longer 
significant. However, the five-year average regression results need to be further 
verified using instrumental variables to check robustness. In addition, because of 
the diversity of countries in the sample, further tests need to be conducted to see 
whether the data have heteroscedaticity.  
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examines the impact of financial services trade liberalization on 
domestic financial liberalization and international bank loans using both a country 
case study and a cross-country panel study on international bank loans to developing 
countries.  
 
The country case study demonstrates that financial services trade liberalization in 
China has set impetus for rapid domestic financial liberalization. Foreign banks, 
though still relatively small in size, have already had considerable impact on China’s 
capital flows mainly between their branches and head offices and also via the 
arbitraging opportunities between domestic and offshore markets. Indeed, the role of 
intermediating capital flows played by foreign banks will become even more 
significant as their total asset size becomes bigger in the future after the barriers to 
entry are further reduced.   
 
The empirical findings from the cross-country panel study indicate that the 
financial services trade liberalization under the WTO promotes bank loans to 
developing economies strongly though not evenly depending on country 
characteristics. Large emerging market economies such as China tend to benefit from 
further financial services liberalization while small and low income economies may 
not necessarily benefit from such liberalization.  
                                                 
13 The result for the region may be due to the effect of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crises when large 
amount of loans was withdrawn from the region.   17
 
Another important finding is that banks loans to developing economies have little 
to do with capital controls of developing economies, possibly implying that financial 
services trade liberalization is likely to make capital controls less effective because of 
the potential capital flows associated with the presence of foreign banks. Therefore, 
financial services liberalization could lead to de facto capital account opening or at 
least accelerate capital account opening in developing economies.  
 
The paper has some important policy implications. On the one hand, the China 
country case study indicates foreign bank presence has spill-over effect or 
demonstration effect on domestic financial institutions, thus promoting efficiency. 
Foreign bank presence can also help speed up domestic institution building as they 
bring both human capital and technology needed to the host economy. Thus, foreign 
banks should be welcome to participate in domestic financial sector.  
  
On the other hand, policy makers in some emerging market economies should be 
aware that once they open up their financial services trade for foreign competition, 
they may also invite more capital flows to their economies, which in turn will tend to 
render the existing capital control regime less effective. Large cross-border capital 
flows will make interest rate differentials between onshore and offshore disappear. 
Therefore, the country can no longer maintain an independent monetary policy. As 
the freedom of capital flows increases and if the objective still is to maintain 
independent monetary policy, the exchange rate regime will have to be made flexible 
as a result. In the case of China, as it is expected to accelerate its financial services 
trade liberalization, the impact on its capital flows will become substantial, which 
implies that China’s capital controls will become more porous in the future. Therefore, 
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Table 1: Domestic versus international capital flows under FSTL
Loans provided by domestic banks Loans provided by foreign banks abroad
Loans involve domestic capital only
No financial services trade and 
international capital flows Financial services trade only
Loans involve international capital 
only International capital flow only
Both financial services trade and international 
capital flows
Source: Kono and Schuknecht (2000) with author's change of classfication
Table 2: Domestic versus international capital flows under FSTL
Loans provided by domestic banks Loans provided by foreign banks in the country
Loans involve domestic capital only
No financial services trade and 
international capital flows Financial services trade plus inward FDI
Loans involve international capital 
only International capital flow only
Financial services trade plus FDI and international 
capital flows
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Table 3: Financial Services Trade and Capital Flows under Different Modes of Supply (No Capital Account Restrictions)
Category of Banking and other 
Financial Services Business
  Acceptance of deposits
  Lending (consumer credit, 
mortgage, commercial loans)
  Financial Leasing
  Payments and money 
transmission (credit cards, 
travelers checks, and bankers 
drafts)
  Gurantees and commitments
Securities trading
   Money market instruments
   Foreign exchange
   Derivatives
   Exchange rate and interest rate 
instruments
   Transferable securities
   Other negotiable instruments
Securities Issurance and 
Underwriting
  Money Broking
  Asset Management (Pension, 
fund management, custodial, 
depository, and trust services)
  Settlement and clearing servies 
for financial assets (securities, 
derivative products, and other 
negotiable instruments)
  Provision and transfer of 
financial information
  Advisory, intermediation and 
other auxiliary financial services
Source: Adapted from Kono and Schuknecht (2000) and Kireyev (2002) with author's change of classifications
Legend: "Y" yes and "N" no. 








































Mode1: Cross-border supply Mode 2: Consumption abroad Mode 3: Commercial Presence
Can FST occur without cross-border 
capital flow?
Can FST occur without cross-border capital 
flow?
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Table 4: Chronology of Foreign Bank Presence in China since 1979
Time Events Geographic  Location Business  Scope
1979
Foreign Bank Representative Offices were allowed: Japan 
Export-Import Bank was the first foreign bank to set up a 
respresentative office in China.
Yes
Limited to Foreign Exchange 
Business
1980 31 foreign bank representative offices were established. Yes
Limited to Foreign Exchange 
Business
 July 1981 Foreign bank business was allowed
Foreign banks can open in 5 
special economic zones 
Only in foreign exchange business
1982
Hong Kong Nanyang Commerical Bank opened branch in 
Shenzhen
Only in foreign exchange business
 September 1990 Foreign banks were allowed to open in Shanghai
5 special economic zones and 
Shanghai
Only in foreign exchange business
1992 Foreign banks were allowed to open in two more cities 7 cities including Dalian Only in foreign exchange business
 August 1994
Foreign banks were allowed to open in 11 inland cities 
including Beijing. Regulations on Foreign Financial 
Institutions were issued for the first time.
23 cities and Hainan Province Only in foreign exchange business
December 1996 to 
August 1998
Foreign banks were allowed to do RMB business in limited 
areas at an experimental basis
RMB business was limited to 
Shanghai Pudong and Shenzhen
RMB deposit and loans, 
settlements, guarantees, government 
bonds, and securities investment
April 1998 Foreign banks were allowed to enter the interbank market
July 1999 Foreign Banks are allowed to expand their RMB business 
Foreign banks' RMB business in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen was 
allowed to expand to their 
neighboring provinces.
1) Foreign banks can borrow from 
central bank up to 100 million for 
their RMB business related 
activities. 2) Foreign banks are 
allowed to  syndicated loan 
business. 3) The RMB loans not 
covered by RMB can be borrowed 
from Chinese banks. 4) Foreign 
banks can enjoy the same treatment 
in the interbank market. Maximum 
borrowing is one time of its 
operating capital. Up to 100 million 
can be borrowed with permission of 
the central bank. 5) RMB liabilities 
to foreign exchange liability ratio 
increased from 35% to 50%.
December  2001 China entered WTO and signed the GATS See Appendix I See Appendix I
December 2002
Foreign banks are allowed to do RMB business in 5 more 
cities
RMB business was expanded to 




Foreign banks are allowed to do RMB business in 4 more 
cities
RMB business was expanded to 




Regulations on Foreign Bank Operation in China Issued by 
CBRC
Maximum foreign branch and 
subsidiary operating capitals were 
lowered to 500 million
See Appendix I
December 2004
Foreign banks are allowed to do RMB business in 5 more 
cities
RMB business was allowed in 
Kunming, Beijing, Xiamen, Xian, 
and Shenyang. Foreign banks are 
encouraged to set up operations in 




Foreign bank RMB restrictions no longer subject to 
geographic and business restriction
See Appendix I
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Table 5: Foreign Bank Presence in China (Top 10 Banks by Assets in Millions of US$)








8 Bank of East Asia 2121.63
9 Deutsch Bank 677.57
10 Dutch Commercial Bank 627.62
Total Foreign Bank Assets 48050.85
Memorandom
Foreign Bank Total Assets as a 
share of total Chinese Banking 
assets 1.40%




Table 6: Foreign Financial Institutions in China
Foreign Bank Subsidiary Joint Venture Bank Foreign Finance Company Total
Subsidiary 14 10 3 27
Branch 162 162
Subsidiary Branch 9 4 13
Sub-Branch 15 1 16
Total 177 9 15 3 218
Data source: China Bank Regulatory Commission (2004).
Table 7: Comparision of Subsidiaries and Branches (Billions of US Dollars)
Subsidiary Branch Total Subsidiary/Branch Ratio
Assets 2.74 46.3 48.8.44 0.059
Loans 1.44 21.04 22.4 0.068
Liabilities 1.65 42.4 43.93 0.039
Deposits 0.8 11.97 12.4 0.067
Profitability 0.021 0.2 0.225 0.105
CAR (%) 35.88 8.17 9.68 4.392
NPL  4.92 2.79 2.93 1.763
Data source: China Bank Regulatory Commission (2004).
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Table 8: Foreign Bank Loans by Sector (Millions of RMB)
Sectors Total Loans Outstanding Percent of Total (%)
Manufacturing sector 119,283 55.8
   Machinery Sector 12,539 5.9
   Electronics Sector 25,969 12.1
   Chemical Sector 26,316 12.3
   Light Industry Sector 26,622 12.4
   Other Manufacturing Sector 27,836 13.0
Real Estate Sector 27,324 12.8
Retail Sector 8,929 4.2
Other Sectors 58,316 27.3
Total 213,851 100.0
 
  Memorandum 
Total Loans in RMB 84,448 39.49
Total Dollar Loan in RMB 165,043 77.18
Total Dollar Loan in Dollar  19,981
Source: China Bank Regulatory Commission (June 2004)
 
 
Table 9: China's Capital Control and Its Effect on Financial Services Trade Liberalization
Restrictions on Commercial Credits Details Comments
    By Residents to non-residents Only authorized by PBOC may lend  Mode 1 allowed but restriction
    To Resident from non-resident Must be Incorporate in the plan for the use of foreign capital, undergo 
transaction-based examination and subject SAFE Approval. Foreign 
funded enterprises may borrow from nonresident without obtaining 
approval but must regester the borrowing with the SAFE.
Mode 1 allowed but restriction
Financial Credits Restrictions on Commercial Credits Apply Mode 1 allowed but restriction
Guarantees, securities
   By residents to nonresidents Prior SAFE Approval Required for financing guarantee Mode 1 allowed but restriction
Prior SAFE Approval not required for non-financing guarantee but 
registration with SAFE required
  To Resident by non-residents Foreign fund firms may accept gurantees from foreign institutions
Provisions and controls specific to 
commercial banks and other credit 
institutions
Details Comments
 Borrowing Abroad Same restrictions on commercial credits apply Mode 1 allowed but restriction
 Maintenance of account abroad Registration with the SAFE is required for domestic banks, domestic 
nonbank financial institutions and nonfinancial enterprise
Mode 2 allowed but with 
restriction
 Lending to non-residents (financial or 
commercial credits)
Same restrictions on commercial credits apply Mode 1 allowed but restriction
 Lending locally in foreign exchange Lending is subject to review by PBOC and to asset-liability ratio 
requirements. Borrowers must register the transactions ex post wit the 
SAFE and must obtain a permit from the SAFE to repay principal. Such 
requirements are no longer required for residents to borrow FX from 
domestic Chinese financial insitutions. But creditor need to inform SAFE 
loan and payment structure.
Mode 2 allowed but with 
restriction
 Differential treatment of deposit account of 
foreign exchange
 Reserve requirement RR of 7.5% for deposits in RMB for all banks
RR of 2% for FX deposits of Chinese funded banks
RR of 5% for FX depostits with maturity less than 3 month, 3% for 
maturity of more than 3 months of foreign funded banks
Reserves on foreign currency are not renumerated
 Liquid Assets Requirement Asset/liability ratio for FX may not be less than 60%
 Credit Controls Lending to a single borrower may not exceed 10%
Source: IMF Annual Report on Foreign Exchange Restrictions (2003)  25
Table 10: Chinese External Debt Data by Borrowers
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central Government  41.6 47.3 48.96 49.8 50.5 52.8
Chinese banks 33.98 34.4 29.84 30 29.1 33.3
Chinese non-bank financial institution 8 6.47 5.72 4.38 4.4 4.3
Chinese firms 15.5 14.7 13.52 11.2 10 7.6
Foreign Funded Enterprises 45.2 47.3 46.5 35.2 33.2 37.8
Foreign banks .. .. .. 17.04 14.5 20.7
Trade Credit 21.6 26.3 36.8
Others 1.76 1.63 1.16 0.88 0.5 0.3
Total 146.04 151.8 145.7 170.1 168.5 193.6
Data source: SAFE website in billions of US dollars.
Note: Reclassification of China's foreign indebtedness was made in 2001 in accordance to the International Standards. 1) Debt of foreign financial 
institutions are inlcuded as domestic debt and at the same time, foreign currency lending of foreign financial insitutions to China borrowers
are deducted from the total foreign debt. 2) All trade credits (including 1-3 month) are included in the total foreign debt. 3) Long-term debt with expected 
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Table 11: Core Regressions, Panel and 5-year Average (1998-2002)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log distance -0.78 *** -0.78 *** -0.78 *** -0.78 *** -0.88 *** -0.88 *** -0.88 *** -0.88 ***
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Log GDP lender 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.46 *** 0.46 *** 0.46 *** 0.46 ***
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Log GDP borrower -0.42 * -0.37 * -0.42 * -0.37 * 0.71 *** 0.57 *** 0.71 *** -0.10
0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.21
Log GDP per capita lender 0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Log GDP per capita borrower 0.42 0.31 0.42 0.31 1.24 *** -0.11 1.24 *** 0.22
0.62 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.23
Common border 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Common language 0.23 * 0.22 * 0.23 * 0.22 * -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Colonial past 1.35 *** 1.36 *** 1.35 *** 1.36 *** 1.68 *** 1.68 *** 1.68 *** 1.68 ***
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Bilateral trade 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 ***
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Exchange rate volatility -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 * 0.08 -0.15 * 0.03
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
IMF crisis dummy -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.32 -0.05 0.31 -0.89 **
0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.73 0.46 0.76 0.45
Capital account restrictions -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 0.33 * -0.02 0.37 **
0.27 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.18
Deposit insurance  0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.70 0.16 3.44 ***
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.74
Financial sector Development -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.56 -1.66 *** -0.52 -1.29 ***
0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.61 0.46 0.66 0.50
Fiscal sector sustainability -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 -0.34
0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
GDP volatility 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -1.14 *** -0.16 -1.14 *** -0.40 *
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.24
Corruption -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -1.38 *** 0.76 -1.38 *** 0.53
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.37 0.50 0.37 0.43
Short-term debt 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.62 *** 0.17 * 0.62 *** 0.22 *
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12
ODA Stock 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.21 *** 0.21 *** 0.21 *** 0.21 ***
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
WTO score total -0.03 0.04
0.06 0.09
WTO score banking -0.03 0.03
0.06 0.08
WTO score total - Latin America -0.04 0.41 **
0.12 0.19
WTO score total - ASEAN+Korea 3.51 0.30 ***
6.85 0.09
WTO score total - China 1.01 *** 0.15
0.30 0.17
WTO score total - offshore 0.74 *** 0.99 ***
0.18 0.25
WTO score banking - Latin America -0.04 0.42 **
0.11 0.19
WTO score banking - ASEAN+Korea 3.35 0.73 ***
6.53 0.13
WTO score banking - China 0.97 *** 0.63 ***
0.29 0.20
WTO score banking - offshore 0.72 *** 0.97 ***
0.18 0.25
Borrower fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2202 2202 2202 2202 663 663 663 663
Sample Panel Panel Panel Panel 5-yr aver 5-yr aver 5-yr aver 5-yr aver
R-square 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739
Root mean squarre error 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.361 1.361 1.361 1.361
Note: signs ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 99, 95, and 90 percent, respectively. Numbers in italics indicate standard deviation.  27
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Figure 3: Foreign Banks Do Follow Their Customers in China
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 Sector or Subsector            
B. Banking and Other 
Financial Services 
(excluding insurance and 
securities) 
Banking services as listed 
below: 
a. Acceptance of deposits 
and other repayable funds 
from the public; 
b. Lending of all types, 
including consumer 
credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring and financing of 
commercial transaction; 
c. Financial leasing; 
d. All payment and 
money transmission 
services, including credit, 
charge and debit cards, 
travellers cheques and 
bankers drafts (including 
import and export 
settlement); 
e. Guarantees and 
commitments; 
f. Trading for own 




- Motor vehicle financing 




(1) Unbound except for the following: - Provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing and 
related software by suppliers of other financial services; 
- Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all activities listed in subparagraphs (a) through (k), 
including credit reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on 
corporate restructuring and strategy. 
(2) None 
(3) A.  Geographic coverage: For foreign currency business, there will be no geographic restriction upon accession. For 
local currency business, the geographic restriction will be phased out as follows: Upon accession, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Tianjin and Dalian; Within one year after accession, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing and Wuhan; within two years 
after accession, Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu and Chongqing; within three years after accession, Kunming, Beijing and Xiamen; 
Within four years after accession, Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang and Xi'an. Within five years after accession, all geographic 
restrictions will be removed. 
B. Clients:  For foreign currency business, foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide services in China 
without restriction as to clients upon accession. For local currency business, within two years after accession, foreign 
financial institutions will be permitted to provide services to Chinese enterprises. Within five years after accession, foreign 
financial institutions will be permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients. Foreign financial institutions licensed for 
local currency business in one region of China may service clients in any other region that has been opened for such 
business. 
C. Licensing:  Criteria for authorization to deal in China's financial services sector are solely prudential (i.e., contain no 
economic needs test or quantitative limits on licenses). Within five years after accession, any existing non-prudential 
measures restricting ownership, operation, and juridical form of foreign financial institutions, including on internal 
branching and licenses, shall be eliminated. Foreign financial institutions who meet the following condition are permitted to 
establish a subsidiary of a foreign bank or a foreign finance company in China: 
- total assets of more than US $10 billion at the end of the year prior to filing the application.  
Foreign financial institutions who meet the following condition are permitted to establish a branch of a foreign bank in 
China: 
- total assets of more than US $20 billion at the end of the year prior to filing the application.   
Foreign financial institutions who meet the following condition are permitted to establish a Chinese-foreign joint bank or a 
Chinese-foreign joint finance company in China: 
- total assets of more than US $10 billion at the end of the year prior to filing the application.  
Qualifications for foreign financial institutions to engage in local currency business are as follows: 
- three years business operation in China and being profitable for two consecutive years prior to the application, otherwise, 
none.  
(4) Unbound except as indicated in Horizontal Commitments. 
(1) Unbound except for the following:  - Provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing and 
related software by suppliers of other financial services; 
- Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all activities listed in subparagraphs (a) through (k), 
including credit reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on 
corporate restructuring and strategy. 
(2) None 
(3) None 




(3) Except  for 
geographic restrictions and 
client limitations on local 
currency business (listed in 
the market access column), 
foreign financial 
institution may do 
business, without 
restrictions or need for 
case-by-case approval, 
with foreign invested 
enterprises, non-Chinese 
natural persons, Chinese 
natural persons and 
Chinese enterprises.  
Otherwise, none. 
(4)  Unbound except as 






(4) Unbound except as 



















- Other financial services 
as listed below: 
k. Provision and transfer 
(1) None 
(2) None 
(3)  None (Criteria for authorization to deal in China's financial services sector are solely prudential (i.e., contain no 
(1) None 
(2) None 
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of financial information, 
and financial data 
processing and related 
software by supplier of 
other financial services; 
l. Advisory, 
intermediation and other 
auxiliary financial 
services on all activities 
listed in subparagraphs 
(a) through (k), including 
credit reference and 
analysis, investment and 
portfolio research and 
advice, advice on 














economic needs test or quantitative limits on licenses). Branches of foreign institutions are permitted. 













(1)  Unbound except for the following:  - Foreign securities institutions may engage directly  (without Chinese 
intermediary) in B share business. 
(2) None 
(3)  
a.  Unbound, except for the following: 
- Upon accession, representative offices in China of foreign securities institutions may become Special Members of all 
Chinese stock exchanges. 
- Upon accession, foreign service suppliers will be permitted to establish joint ventures with foreign investment up to 
33 per cent to conduct domestic securities investment fund management business. Within three years after China's 
accession, foreign investment shall be increased to 49 per cent. Within three years after accession, foreign securities 
institutions will be permitted to establish joint ventures, with foreign minority ownership not exceeding 1/3, to engage 
(without Chinese intermediary) in underwriting A shares and in underwriting and trading of B and H shares as well as 
government and corporate debts, launching of funds. 
b.   Criteria for authorization to deal in China's financial industry are solely prudential (i.e., contain no economic needs 
test or quantitative limits on licenses). 
(4)  Unbound except as indicated in Horizontal Commitments. 
(4) Unbound except as 















(4) Unbound except as 









 Appendix II: Metrics used to calculate the financial services trade liberalization commitment
Numer i cal  V alues Score
No  ment i on  i n  the  schedul e  or  not  a  W TO   m em ber 0
Unbound  agai nst relevant  m ode 0. 05
No  new  entry  -  unbound  f or  new  entry 0. 1
Di scretionary l i censi ng  -Econom i c  needs  test
Li censi ng/Authori zati on  Requi rem ents;   acqui si tion  approval  -  n o t 
me n t i oni ng  term s,   condi tions,   or  procedures 0. 3
Vot i ng/O wnershi p  <50% 0. 35
Li mi ted C om m ittm ents 0. 4
Li cense/Authori zati on by supervi sor (central b an k, associ ati on) ,  
acqui si tion approval  -  w ith indi cati ons  or  gui di ng  pri nci pl es 0. 5
Mi nor  l i mi tations  ( grandf atheri ng  cl ause,  legal  fo rm , n u m b e r o f 
observati ons,   ownershi p  >50%,  typ e s o f o p e rations,  valu e  o f 
transactions/assets,   reci proci ty  and  regi stration  requi rem ents)
0. 75
No  l i mi tations 1
Li beral i zati on  Com m i ttm ents in
A  -  I nsurance  servi ces  ( di rect li f e  and  nonl i fe  insurance,  re insurance,  
i nterm edi ati on) M ode  1:   Cross-border  suppl y
B-  Banki ng  servi ces  ( deposi ts, lendi ng,  m o n e y b ro king,  trading) M ode  2:  C o n su m p tion abroad
C-  Securi ties  servi ces  ( underwri ting,  se ttlem ent,   asset  m anagem ent) M ode  3:  C o m m e rc ial  p re se n c e
D -  O th e r financi al  se rvices  ( suppl y o f financi al  inf orm ati on,  paym ents 
and settl em ents)
Source:  V o lckx  ( 2002)
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Appendix III: Data Sources and Financial Commitment Index 
Variables Sources
For ei gn cl ai ms   c l assi fe d b y m aturity B ank for International  S ettlem ents (B IS ) w e bsite
Bor der ,  L an guage, C o lony http: //facul ty.haas. berkel ey. edu/arose/
G ross savi ngs I FS
C urrent A ccount B alance I FS
Tr ade  Bal ances I FS
Bal ance on goods and servi ces I FS
In co m e  (cred it, de bit) IF S
C urrent T ransfer (C redit, de bit) IF S
E xpo rt and  Im p o rt o f go o ds   IF S
Ser vi ce  ( credi t, de bit) IF S
Capi tal  Account I FS
Capi tal infl o w  and  o utflow I FS
Budget  def i ci tI F S
Lendi ng  i nterest  rate I FS
Reser ves I FS
For ei gn Assets I FS
Dem and  Deposi tI F S
Ti me   s a v i n g an d fo reign currency deposi ts IF S
For ei gn Li abi l i ty IF S
International  R e serve IF S
Foregn exchange I FS
Deposi t m oney banks (assets,  li abi l i ties) I FS
For ei gn exchange rate I FS
Por t f ol i o  i nvestm ent I FS
Fi nanci al   Account I FS
Qu a s i  m o ney and  m o ne y (M 2) IF S
Exchange rate regi me s I MF  s t a t i sti cal   yearbooks
Net savi ngs O ECD  websi te
Com ponents  of   current  account  ( goods,  services,  
com pensati o n o f e m ployess,  direct i nvestm ent i ncom e,  
portf ol i o  and  other  i nvestm ent i ncom e,  current 
transfers)
UNCTAD  websi te  (H andb o o k o f statisti cs)
F D I - total inward posi tio n W B  an d IF S
E xternal debt W B-I M F-BI S-O ECD
Budget  def i ci t (%  o f G D P ) W o rld Bank
E xpo rt and  Im p o rt o f go o ds and  servic es (%  o f G D P ) W o rld Bank websi te
In flati on rate W orld Bank websi te  
GDP,  G D P  pe r cap ita, p o pu lati on,  G D P  gro w th rates W o rld Bank websi te an d W o rld  Devel opm ent  I ndi cators  
E xpo rt and  Im p o rt o f o th er services W TO  websi te  
Fi nanci al  li beral i zati on  scores
W TO  websi te -  F inanci al  co m m itm e nts                     
Al exei .  K .,  "Li beral i zati o n o f T rade  in  Fi nanci al  S ervices 
and Fi nanci al  S ec to r S tab il i ty (A n alyti cal  Approach)",  
August 2002,  IM F  w e bsite
Is titution I CRG,  W o rld Bank
Bi l ateral  trade D irectio n o f T rade, IM F
Bi l ateral  d istance WWW. IN D O .COM/Di stance
Bi l ateral  F D I O E C D  
 